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Blue-Collar Job, Blue-Collar Career:
Policemen’s Perplexing Struggle for a
Voice in Birmingham, Liverpool, and
Manchester, 1900-1919
Joanne Klein
There is no comparison between what is expected
from the policeman of to-day and the policeman of
old.... [But] because we have evolved from the
‘Bobby of old’ to what we are to-day, you are not
paying us as much as the lowest paid labourer.
– P.S. George Miles, Liverpool City Police.
[I]t was considered by the authorities that we had
means of representation. We put forward that it
was not so and that up to the present we have
many grievances but have no means of airing
those grievances.
– P.S. Matthew Seaman, Manchester City Police2.
1 These two sergeants voiced concerns shared by many in England’s police forces at the
turn of the twentieth century, that police authorities failed to recognize that police work
was evolving into a skilled career. Watch committees continued to identify policemen as
unskilled labor since categorizing policing as skilled would require paying the men more.
Yet they required policemen to carry out an increasing variety of duties and insisted on
police families living in respectable working-class neighborhoods that they could not
easily afford. Policemen pointed out the contradiction between their unskilled pay and
the  expectation that  they  work  and live  like  skilled  workers,  but  watch committees
ignored them. This occurred at the same time that workers across England complained
that wages were not keeping pace with inflation, feeding the growth of New Unions which
represented  both  skilled  and  unskilled  labor.  Authorities  failed  to  remember  that
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policemen were working class themselves and could not fail to notice that their union
friends  were  taken  more  seriously  by  employers  than  policemen  were  by  watch
committees. Policemen tried to reason with authorities but without success, leading to
growing insistence on an organization to give them a voice and eventually to demands for
a police union.
2 The stresses of the First World War combined with continued silence in response to police
concerns  finally  precipitated  police  strikes  in  London  in  1918  and  in  Liverpool,
Birmingham  and  London  in  1919.  The  parliamentary  committee  investigating  this
embarrassing  breakdown  of  the  ‘best  police  in  the  world’  concluded  that  official
ignorance of the state of their own men and watch committees’ refusal to listen was the
origin of much of the problem. The committee recognized policemen as skilled workers,
recommending new scales of pay and conditions of service. While policemen remained
skeptical  of  the  Police  Federation created to  give  them a  voice,  the  concession that
policemen  needed  an  association  of  any  kind  was  a  gain over  pre-strike  attitudes.
Ironically,  due to considerable turnover in personnel due to the war and the strikes,
recruits hired under the new conditions became identified with the ‘new police’ described
by P.S. Miles while the men who had struggled to win this recognition rarely escaped the
label of ‘old.’
3 Before  the  twentieth  century,  policing  had  been  a  working-class  job  classed  with
unskilled agricultural labor. Three-quarters of recruits left before they reached five years
service, and only fifteen percent made it to retirement age. Policemen tried to improve
their work conditions but their being unskilled left them in a weak position with local
government. Policemen tried petitioning parliament, but the government took its time
studying requests. A 1870s and 1880s campaign for pension rights only succeeded after
the  1889  Great  London  Dock  Strike  convinced  parliament  that  they  needed  reliable
policemen during tumultuous union activity. By the turn of the century, policing was
changing. Between 1900 and 1919, only forty percent of Manchester City Police recruits
left with less than five years service, and forty percent made it to retirement age3.  A
similar pattern appeared in Liverpool and Birmingham. Changes in conditions of service
contributed to this shift, particularly the 1890 Police Act which guaranteed pensions after
twenty-five years of service or fifteen years for medical disability4. Others factors were
new duties such as traffic duty, first aid, and child welfare, and new skills as wireless
operators,  auto mechanics,  and photographers.  Recruits needed a better education to
handle the new responsibilities. The combination of pensions and more complex duties
attracted men looking for long-term rather than short-term employment.
4 With pension rights and increasingly diverse duties, policemen began thinking in terms
of a police career. But they learned that even national legislation could not change local
governments’ views on policing. Watch committees, the legal authorities that dealt with
police  conditions of  service  in  borough  forces  such  as  Birmingham,  Liverpool  and
Manchester, held onto traditional definitions of policing in order to economize. Locally,
pensions were tied to age in addition to time served to delay paying them for as long as
possible. Watch committees were reluctant to recognize that pay scales were failing to
keep pace with inflation, let alone to consider upgrading scales to skilled levels. Higher
pay meant higher pensions for policemen, another reason to keep pay scales low. Another
problem  with  national  legislation  was  that  it  could  not  solve  local  problems  with
discipline, corruption, and favoritism.
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5 Policemen noticed that they were working harder while their pay scales were eroding.
Yet they lacked an effective way to influence watch committees and chief constables. The
obvious option of a union was not realistic even when they saw unions working for their
friends. Most policemen agreed that a police union conflicted with their oath of office to
serve the king, preserve the peace, and discharge their duties according to law5. A police
union  that  could  challenge  authorities  or  declare  a  strike  was  generally  seen  as
inconsistent with keeping the peace. This was especially true for men thinking of a police
career. The public nature of a challenge to authority could tempt civilians to call into
question the good standing of the police system. In addition, many policemen hesitated to
consider direct action for fear of losing their pensions. Instead, they tried to improve
their  situation using  tactics  within  the  accepted boundaries  of  police  behavior.  This
generally meant petitioning watch committees. Sometimes petitions met with success but
mostly they did not.
6 Policemen tended to be more willing to voice their concerns in police forces with better
relationships  between  chief  constables  and  the  ranks.  Policemen  in  the  City  of
Manchester  frequently  organized  delegations  and  petitions  since  their  chief  was
considered to be willing to listen. Chief Constable Robert Peacock (1898-1926) began his
career as a beat constable in Manchester, so he understood the struggles of local beat life.
The city force was by no means free from corruption, but its reputation was better than
many. In the City of Liverpool, Head Constables6 John William Nott Bower (1881-1902) and
Leonard Dunning (1902-1912) began their careers in the Royal Irish Constabulary, more of
a military organization than a police force. This led to too much distance and a lack of
understanding between them and their men. The Liverpool force tended to be described
as  ‘seething’  and  its  morale  was  poor.  While  factions  and  corruption  were  common
elsewhere, Liverpool was a national by-word among policemen for nepotism, patronage,
and  religious  turmoil7.  Chief  Constable  Charles  Rafter  of  the  City  of  Birmingham
(1899-1935), also Royal Irish Constabulary, was autocratic even for that body, continually
stressing the importance of unquestioning ‘loyalty to the force’. The men had to petition
Rafter for permission to discuss force issues amongst themselves. This discouraged them
from petitioning for better pay and conditions,  and left  their watch committee more
misinformed than most about the morale of their policemen.
7 At the same time that policemen faced barriers communicating with authorities over
them, they acquired a way to communicate with each other across force lines. In 1893,
John Kempster  founded the  Police  Review and  Parade  Gossip,  a  national  publication to
provide a forum for policemen to air their grievances and to compare local conditions8.
Letters to the Review allowed policemen to share their hopes and fears with each other.
Policemen wanted regular days off and better pay; they wanted to clean up corruption
and favoritism that endangered promotions and pensions; and they wanted their work
recognized as skilled. Since policemen did not have a union or association, the Review
provided an important resource for coordinating pressure put on both local and national
government.  It  supplied information on different  forces  that  policemen could use to
assess  local  conditions  within  a  national  context  and  to  strengthen  requests  for
improvements at home. The Review helped foster a sense of national camaraderie for
policemen, representing the potentially dangerous reality of policemen finding common
cause with each other at the same time that they felt estranged from those above them.
8 In 1900, with help from the Review, policemen across England began pressuring watch
committees for improved pay since most pay scales had not been adjusted since the 1890
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Police Act. Policemen remembered that it had taken a great strike to gain pensions, and
hoped that growing strike activity might convince governments to take their petitions
seriously. To launch this effort, the Review published a list of a hundred and twenty-two
English borough rates of pay for constables, including the strength of each force and age
or time required for pensions. Manchester and Birmingham constables began at twenty-
four shillings a week, and Liverpool at twenty-five shillings, with seven pence going to
the  pension  fund.  This  was  typical  of  borough  forces  regardless  of  size9.  Watch
committees delayed pay increases as long as possible, arguing that policemen were not
considering their free medical care, uniforms, boots, and rent allowances in addition to
pay. Policemen countered that these items did not figure into their pensions. But watch
committees, answerable to local rate payers, proved difficult to convince.
9 In  March  1900,  a  delegation  of  Manchester  inspectors,  sergeants  and  constables
petitioned their watch committee, an unusual combination of ranks that reflected the
more open climate in their force and gave their petition more weight. They pointed out
that their scale of pay had been set in 1890 and did not keep pace with inflation. In
consequence, they were paid less than «all classes of workmen» yet «if we are to maintain
an independent and respectable station in life, it is absolutely necessary that our wages
should be increased to enable us to do so». Policemen were expected to practice «conduct
becoming a police officer» both on and off duty. By 1900, as their responsibilities grew,
this meant respectable artisans’ behavior. Policemen accepted this since they hoped to
see  policing  recognized  as  a  respectable  career.  The  watch  committee  postponed
consideration of the petition for economic reasons10. However, at the same time, Chief
Constable Peacock’s salary was raised from £800 to £1000 per annum to reward him for
economies that saved the city £4000 a year11. A Manchester inspector wrote to the Review,
«it seems hard that their request for increased pay should have to be put back because
the authorities have been too lavish in their expenditures»12. This echoed other letters
criticizing watch committees for underpaying their police forces to «save rate payers» or
to  compensate  for  overspending  elsewhere.  In  February  1901,  the  watch  committee
finally granted a raise of a shilling a week13. While better than other cities were willing to
offer, it kept Manchester’s pay within the 1900 national average.
10 Liverpool  sergeants  and  constables  submitted  a  petition  in  July  1900  similar  to
Manchester’s but without the help of inspectors14. They included more detailed financial
evidence to back up their requests, perhaps learning from Manchester’s initial failure.
They began with basic figures, including rent increases from six pence to a shilling over
the last five years. They pointed out that they did not have the option of seeking cheaper
housing in less respectable neighborhoods since housing had to be approved. They gave
details on artisans’ wages ten to fifteen shillings a week higher than police wages, and yet
policemen were «expected to keep up a position equal to them and to clothe our children
respectably».  Unlike  Manchester,  they  provided  detailed  comparisons  to  forces  with
better pay and conditions, hoping this could help their case. In spite of this effort, the
watch committee rejected most of  the petition.  In November,  they granted first-year
constables an additional seven pence a week but nothing more15.
11 Birmingham men seemed too intimidated by Chief Constable Rafter to petition though
much unofficial grumbling took place. Letters in the Review belittled the Birmingham city
motto of ‘Forward’ since their policemen were among the last to ask for, let alone receive,
a pay raise16. Finally, in November 1901, ‘A’ division solicited permission from Rafter to
meet and put forward a delegation to the watch committee regarding pay, duty, and leave
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17. That same day, Rafter wrote a letter to one of his superintendents expressing his deep
distaste for ‘subversive activity’. He considered
furtively signing a round-robbin, circulating anonymous circulars among members
of  the  Force,  unauthorised  or  secret  meetings,  anonymous  letters  to  the  press
putting forward alleged grievances derogatory to the character and discipline of
the Birmingham City Police Force...  highly insubordinate and reflects discredit...
upon those... taking part in such proceedings18.
12 He was particularly annoyed by ‘paragraphs’ showing up in local newspapers. While he
gave permission for the ‘A’ divisions to meet, their petition was shelved by the watch
committee during the Lloyd George riots in December and was then ‘lost’19. This simply
encouraged his men to keep to ‘subversive’  tactics.  In 1903,  constables and sergeants
finally petitioned the watch committee again. They decided to request not only better pay
but also more leave and a major change in their shift system. Possibly, they hoped that by
asking  for  three  changes,  they  might  at  least  gain  something.  Their  pay  demands
succeeded when the committee investigated the petition’s claims and found that most
principle forces in England had revised their scales of pay in 1900 and 1901. However, the
new scale was a mixed blessing,  giving one and two shilling raises to some men but
nothing to others. The committee granted two additional days of leave per year as well.
Given the lateness of the city’s pay increase compared to elsewhere, the leave days were
needed to  attract  recruits  who were  avoiding Birmingham.  The hope for  substantial
change in the shift system failed20. Birmingham had such a bad reputation that the Review
called its watch committee «the most indifferent and the meanest towards its Police of all
the great corporations in the country»21.
13 The  unofficial  organizing  that  Rafter  complained  about  in  Birmingham  was  also
appearing in Liverpool. In 1907, constables elected delegates to write a strong petition for
better pay and additional annual leave. The delegates created an elaborate document.
They first  presented a  detailed  weekly  budget  of  a  married  man with  two children,
receiving £1/13/3d. a week. Expenses for rent, coal, groceries, and friendly societies came
to  £1/10/9d.  They  pointed  out  that  this  did  not  include  anything  for  clothing,
newspapers, the doctor, holidays, tram fares, and church. They detailed how prices had
increased  while  their  pay  remained  the  same,  making  it  impossible  «to  keep  up  a
respectable  appearance required of  him and his  family».  They emphasized that  rent
allowances were only given for «approved» neighborhoods where they could not afford to
live.  They compared their scale of pay to police forces in Leeds and Blackburn. They
insisted that «we are entitled to have justice meted out to us». The petition was signed
«on behalf of the elected delegates from each Division representing 1 605 Constables». In
spite of their appeals to respectability and justice, the watch committee was «unable to
accede to the constables’ request»22.
14 Petitioning resulted in some limited success but mostly in failure, leading to growing
frustration as pay scales continued to erode. Not surprisingly, policemen connected their
inability to get results to their inability to organize. The idea of a police union was not
new, policemen having flirted with the idea in the previous century. But deteriorating
pay, ineffective petitions, and the national forum provided by the Review led to increasing
debate over the need for strong representation. Growing union activity by other workers
led policemen to wonder how they could improve their own lot. They tried to find some
solution short of a ‘real’ union but were baffled by how to give such a group the influence
they  needed.  ‘Brum’  believed that  policemen should  support  the  Police  and Citizens
Association (PACA), a lobby and ‘self-help’ group which Kempster promoted in the pages
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of the Review23.  But while PACA had appeal, it  could not address local problems with
discipline and promotion. ‘One and All’ suggested that police pensioners be delegated to
represent different forces at conferences to discuss matters and to lobby national and
local government24. Men debated the benefits of having a full trade union with a right to
strike  versus  a  federation  with  the  right  to  confer.  Disagreements  could  be  sharp,
showing  internal  divisions  over  what  direction  to  take.  A  Birmingham  policeman
wondered why chief constables could have an association but the rank and file could not.
He went so far as to consider «the feeling of this Force... akin to that of Russia against its
autocratic government»25. While most believed that they had a right to an organization,
many felt great ambivalence towards the right to strike. They knew that a police ‘down
tools’ would endanger neighborhoods and businesses; a Liverpool constable believed it
was wrong for policemen to «throw the general public to the wolves»26. Some but not
many supported the idea of associating with the Trade Union Conference (TUC), creating
the problem of sympathy strikes for and by policemen. Most recognized the conflict of
interest between policing strikes and striking themselves. But regardless of reservations,
policemen wondered what options they had if authorities refused to listen.
15 Joseph Kempster, alarmed by the growing number of letters to his Review supporting a
union, began a national campaign in January 1906 to lobby local and national government
to  grant  policemen  a  weekly  rest  day.  He  hoped  its  success  would  demonstrate  to
policemen that options to a union still existed. But similar to the 1900-1901 pay scale
drive,  watch  committees  were  slow  to  respond.  In  1907,  Birmingham  approved  an
increase to two days per month for sergeants and constables which required the hiring of
twenty-six more  men27.  In  1908,  Manchester  policemen  were  granted  one  day  off  a
fortnight. But watch committees used granting days off as a reason not to increase pay. In
1909,  Manchester  sergeants  petitioned the  watch committee  to  place  their  pay on a
similar scale to sergeants in other forces, but without success since they had received
days off the year before28. Getting watch committees to improve policemen’s conditions
of  service  remained  an  agonizing  process.  ‘Cui  Bono’  compared  policemen to  Saxon
slaves, where masters could grant requests and be seen as benevolent but slaves could not
make those same requests without being labeled disloyal29.
16 It took four years for the weekly rest day to be implemented nationally. In 1909, in the
midst of considering legislation on pensions, national insurance and minimum wages,
parliament granted the Metropolitan and City of London Police Forces a weekly rest day.
A constable outside of London remarked, «Why the Metropolitan should be singled out
for this boon we fail to see, except that they happen to be constantly under the eye of
Parliament»30.  Some forces followed London’s lead but not all. The Birmingham watch
committee postponed consideration of a weekly rest day «pending a definite expression
of opinion from the rate payers as to whether that expense should be incurred»31.  A
‘Manchurian’ described how a deputation had been told by their watch committee that
«they must be able to give a reason for spending an extra £10,000 a year»32. A Liverpool
constable warned of dangerously low morale due to this foot-dragging while policemen
elsewhere got their day33. A Birmingham constable pointed out the hypocrisy of his city,
«Surely our city Fathers are not withholding this righteous boon from a deserving body of
public servants on the plea of economy, whilst their employees in other departments are
enjoying this precious privilege»34. Policemen felt unappreciated and neglected. Finally,
growing strike activity nationally  made the idea of  police unrest  unattractive to the
national  government.  Parliament  enacted  the  Police  Weekly  Rest  Day  bill  in  1910,
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recognizing the justice of complaints that London police had benefited from being under
the government’s nose.
17 But watch committees refused to implement the rest day completely, similar to their
modification of the 1890 pensions law. Letters to the Review complained that the rest day
was not being implemented due to various ‘emergencies,’  usually tied to strikes. This
aggravated  policemen  who  thought  that  their  efforts  had  finally  prevailed.  Watch
committees failed to consider how growing union activity might influence policemen.
Watch committees’ tendency to use lack of money to evade improving police conditions
of  service,  even  when  mandated  by  national  legislation,  reinforced  the  belief  that
policemen needed some means of genuine leverage. Kempster’s attempt to demonstrate
that lobbying governments could be a successful alternative to organizing had backfired.
18 After years of being ‘economized’ and of futile petitioning, police unionism was ‘in the
air.’ Miners, transport and railway workers were unionized and staging a strike epidemic.
This added to police work loads and stressful overtime as well as police frustrations with
their  own  lack  of  options.  They  continued  petitioning  but  failures  reinforced  the
conviction that policemen needed a union. Birmingham policemen stopped petitioning
altogether and Rafter heard rumors of a local police union in 1911 during the national
railway strike35. In 1912, Liverpool constables asked for permission to form a union; not
surprisingly the watch committee refused36. That same year, Francis Caldwell took over as
head constable, a product of the hated ‘office clerk’ track rather than the street beats.
This  seemed to confirm all  that  was wrong with Liverpool,  making petitioning seem
pointless37. In 1911 and 1912, Manchester constables petitioned for higher pay but the
watch  committee  rejected  both  requests38.  One  Manchester  constable  challenged  his
colleagues, «Are you going to let the authorities ‘economise’ for ever, at your expense?»39.
Another Manchester constable wondered why, «when the whole industrial community is
at  war with the powers that be,  the Police forces of  this country are apparently the
weakest  set  of  men  in  the  whole  community».  He  suggested  that  policemen  «take
advantage  of  the  great  opportunity  which  now  presents  itself»,  that  they  use  the
industrial  «war» to  their  advantage40.  The formation of  a  Paris  police  union in 1912
encouraged policemen and worried authorities41. In September 1913, an advertisement
appeared in the Review informing London police that they could secretly join a union
there42.  In support of  this idea,  a Mancunian observed that tram drivers made much
better  pay  than  policemen  because  of  their  union,  but  that  policemen  were  «not
organised, and have nothing behind to back us up»43.  Belligerent letters to the Review
reveal the impatience resulting from seeing friends benefit from unions while policemen
had nothing44.
19 In October 1913, in a sign that Birmingham policemen had organized regardless of orders
against it,  three to four hundred men protested against inadequate compensation for
extra duty during a railway strike by refusing to sign their pay sheets. This approached
nearly half the force. Their objections came as a complete surprise to Rafter, a sign of the
lack of communication between higher and lower ranks. Efforts to change the pay award
were ignored as the actions of a «few grumblers»45. Soon after the failed protest, rumors
of «an association within the Police Force» reached Rafter, who immediately reminded
his men of rules against private  meetings of policemen46. But at least some Birmingham
men were so frustrated with Rafter that they created an association anyway. As reported
in  the  Birmingham  Evening  Dispatch,  they  aimed to  insure  fair  promotions,  give  legal
representation in  discipline  cases,  fully  implement  the  weekly  rest  day,  and achieve
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better pay and allowances.  The association secretary believed that  joining was not  a
breach of force rules but Rafter begged to differ. In a police order, he stated that such
meetings were contrary to rules of service unless of a «legitimate purpose» cleared with
the chief constable47.
20 The Birmingham association was just one of a number of small local unions formed by a
core of  men around the country,  frustrated with the refusal  of  authorities  to  listen.
Worried about the militant tone of letters to the Review,  Kempster tried to suggest a
federation or board as an alternative to a union48. But his readers showed little interest in
this idea49. This trend was serious enough that in November 1913, the Under Secretary of
State sent a circular letter to all chief constables, stating the government’s position that
«it was impossible to allow a Union or Association to be established in an organized and
disciplined  Force  where  ready  obedience  to  the  orders  of  a  superior  officer  was  a
condition of service accepted by all who joined the Force, and essential to its existence»50.
Unfortunately, in light of later developments, police authorities and governments had no
constructive response to the growing unrest.
21 The outbreak of war on 4 August 1914 muted calls for a police union but the strains of war
soon caused frustrations to break out more forcefully. Just before the war, Birmingham
had granted new scales  of  pay starting at  twenty-nine shillings  a  week51 but  almost
immediately had to grant their men non-pensionable bonuses in reaction to wartime
inflation.  Other  forces  followed  suit.  Authorities  made  it  clear  that  they  considered
bonuses to be temporary since prices were expected to return to pre-war levels once the
war ended52. Adding to the strain, each force set its own bonus rates, varying from two to
twelve shillings, creating resentment against watch committees which set low amounts53.
Manchester men did not receive war bonuses at all, perhaps since they had received a pay
raise beginning at twenty-eight shillings a week in January54. In October 1915 letters to
the Review, Mancunians complained that they were being disciplined for not paying their
just debts yet they received no bonus55. In March 1916 three Manchester divisions finally
petitioned  the  watch  committee,  declaring  that  they  had  «loyally  refrained  from
petitioning for more pay until we cannot now obtain bare necessities and view with alarm
the continued rise in the cost of all commodities»56. An editorial in the Review expressed
concern that Manchester policemen were losing confidence in authorities to treat them
honorably, tempting them to join a police union active in London57. In April, they finally
received extra day duty pay of six shillings a week58. Only in January 1917 did Manchester
grant policemen a war bonus of seven shillings a week59.
22 Even with bonuses, police pay did not keep pace with wartime inflation, which raised the
cost of living by anywhere from eighty to 130 percent60.  Men and their families were
forced to violate conditions of service against outside employment to pay bills61. Forces
were losing men to high-paying war occupations, putting more pressure on the men who
remained. Some wondered if this attrition was a deliberate plot by watch committees to
get out of pension obligations. In June 1917, Birmingham policemen sent a memorial to
their watch committee begging for their bonus to be raised. While receiving a raise to
nine and a half shillings, they knew that other forces received twelve shillings or more62.
Also in June,  wives of  Liverpool  constables in his  majesty’s  forces complained to the
watch committee that their allowances were inadequate; in October Birmingham wives
followed their example. The cities had to raise wives’ allowances to twenty shillings a
week  to  avoid  embarrassing  publicity63.  Police  bonuses  were  raised  with  increasing
frequency in an attempt to match inflation, but only after pressure from policemen64.
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Letters to the Review from men and their wives became more bitter and angry as the war
continued, often aimed at the authorities who were supposed to protect their interests. A
Manchester constable wrote in August 1917,
«a point I should like to draw the Authorities’ attention to is that not being allowed
to organize, they should not allow us to be scoffed at by our neighbors, who can
force their demands through trade unions. We have to purchase in the same market
as these men who receive 100 percent more pay. We appeal to the Authorities to
remember that when dealing generously with trade union men not to forget their
public servants, the Police, who are absolutely in their hands»65.
Pre-war  frustrations  over  slow  responses  from  watch  committees  became  intensely
focused under the pressures of war. Resentment escalated when policemen were told that
demands for more pay were disloyal and unpatriotic.
23 On top of anxieties over pay, the war undermined the one area of police success, the
weekly  rest  day.  Like  pay,  leave  days  were  handled  chaotically.  On  5  August 1914
Manchester policemen were told that «leave to all members of the Force will be stopped
at once». By the end of November this was revised, allowing one day off in fourteen. In
January 1915,  one day in seven was restored only to be changed back to one day in
fourteen  in  June  as  the  number  of  police  sent  to  the  front  lines  increased66.  In
Birmingham, leave was stopped from August to October 1914, changed to two days a
month, back to a weekly rest day from November 1914 to November 1915, then changed
back to two days a month for the remainder of the war67. In Manchester, the men were
paid for  the extra days they worked beginning in 1916;  in Liverpool  they were paid
beginning in 1917; in Birmingham, pay arrangements for lost rest days were not made
until January 191968. A Liverpool policeman complained that while suspending the rest
day for a reasonable period was acceptable, doing so indefinitely was not. When «seething
discontent» in that city forced the watch committee to allow one day in ten in December
1914,  the committee accused the men of  being unpatriotic.  The police  responded by
organizing a boycott of their weekly War Fund contributions69.  The watch committee
then changed rest days back to one day a fortnight. The constant fluctuation of policies
left policemen wondering about the competence of their leadership.
24 By the end of 1917, policemen had had three years of non-pensionable bonuses on top of
inadequate  pensionable  pay  scales.  Men  complained  that  denying  them  pensionable
wages for so long seemed like yet another way for local authorities to economize at their
expense. Watch committees finally began adopting new scales of pay as well as increasing
bonuses, war pressures giving policemen more leverage. In October, Birmingham raised
pay to thirty-one shillings a week70, in November, Liverpool adopted a scale starting at
thirty-five  shillings.  But  Manchester  was  late  again.  In  January  1918,  a  Manchester
constable advised local authorities that if they did not «wake up» and pay the men a just
wage that  they «will  be  wanting Policemen after  the war»71.  Finally,  in  March 1918,
Manchester adopted a scale starting at thirty-five shillings, and increased their bonus to
sixteen shillings72. Even with these improvements, police wages were low compared to
other workers, leaving them with unskilled status at the same time that wartime duties
threatened to overwhelm them.
25 With authorities insisting that the new pay scales were basically adequate, policemen
began to listen to the National Union of Police and Prison Officers (NUPPO). Originating in
the  London  Metropolitan  area,  NUPPO  branches  began  to  appear  in  the  provinces,
especially after the union adopted a ‘no strike’ policy in 1917. A month after granting the
belated pay raise,  the Manchester watch committee expressed surprise that a NUPPO
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branch existed in their city when a delegation of five union members appeared before
them. The committee reminded the men that «every facility is given to members of the
Force who desire to bring any grievances they may have before the Chief Constable or the
Watch Committee»73. They knew of no cause for dissatisfaction in the Manchester police
force,  in  spite  of  their  delays  in  granting  pay  and bonus  increases.  In  August  1918,
Peacock complained to the Home Office that P.C. Thiel of London was agitating for the
NUPPO in  Manchester.  In  response,  Thiel  was  dismissed on 25  August  1918.  Sensing
trouble, Peacock convinced the watch committee to reinstate the weekly rest day on 22
August,  to  begin  1  September,  and  to  raise  the  war  bonus  to  twenty  shillings.  The
existence of a local NUPPO branch had convinced the watch committee to take police
complaints seriously and they listened to Peacock. He announced this news to the men on
29 August74, the same day that the Metropolitan and City of London police forces struck
for better pay, recognition of the union, and reinstatement of Thiel75.  Catching many
policemen by surprise, NUPPO leadership had abandoned the ‘no strike’ policy.
26 The 1918 London police  strike  caused major  problems for  the government  since the
NUPPO’s demands for better wages were publicly perceived as just76.  Even The Times,
which called the strike a mutiny, believed that the policemen had a legitimate case77.
Memories of the part played by disaffected policemen in the Russian revolution were at
the back of the government’s mind. Left with few options, Prime Minister Lloyd George
issued the new ‘Met scale’  starting at forty-three shillings with a twelve shilling war
bonus. He promised to investigate grievances by setting up the Committee on the Police
Service  of  England,  Wales,  and Scotland,  more  commonly  known as  the  Desborough
Committee. None of the strikers was dismissed; Thiel was reinstated; and Lloyd George
created the impression that the NUPPO would be recognized after the war by declaring
that the union could not be recognized during wartime78.
27 In spite of a general feeling among policemen that they should not be able to ‘down tools’,
the question remained why a strike had been necessary before authorities listened to
police  grievances.  London  police  commissioners  had  insisted  that  no  serious  unrest
existed in their forces only days before the strike began, similar to Manchester’s surprise
that their men had unionized earlier in the year. Both incidents show how serious the
lack of communication between authorities and policemen had become. In hindsight, Sir
Arthur Dixon from the Home Office realized that «the absence of any regular machinery
for  the  submitting of  local  or  collective  representations  left  grievances  in  too  many
instances without any satisfactory outlet,  and this led to increasing agitation for the
‘right to confer’ and to the appearance of [the NUPPO]»79. The Review considered this lack
of machinery for policemen to discuss and present grievances regarding conditions of
service  to  be  the  sole  cause  of  the  strike80.  For  decades,  policemen  had  tried  to
communicate with those in authority and the authorities had no incentive to listen to
them.
28 After the strike, watch committees everywhere quickly adopted the ‘Met scale’ to prevent
union trouble from spreading to their own forces. The rapid adoption of the scale gave
the  impression of  authorities  scrambling  to  react  to  events.  But  better  pay  was  not
enough to silence police grievances.  Policemen now had concrete proof that a union
could bring fantastic results. Other forces suddenly had active NUPPO branches, much to
the horror of chief constables who preferred to assume that ‘their men’ would not follow
London’s example. The NUPPO claimed 50,000 members in November 1918. Even more
disturbing  for  authorities,  NUPPO’s  concerns  often  focused  on  systemic  problems  of
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corruption,  favoritism, promotion,  assignments and discipline rather than simple pay
issues81.
29 In Manchester, to counteract NUPPO influence, chief constable Peacock quickly arranged
to hear from his men directly. On 5 September 1918 he gave permission to a committee of
sergeants to institute «a scheme for providing representative committees to deal with
matters relating to the Police Service»82. In spite of this, the Manchester branch of the
NUPPO remained vocal,  their  main concern being pay.  In early  October,  they sent  a
delegation to Peacock requesting that the union be recognized, that pay be raised one
hundred percent, and that a non-contributory widow’s pension be created. He replied
that their current scale and bonus matched the Met scale and expressed skepticism about
NUPPO claims to represent the force. The Manchester union went so far as to threaten to
strike at this reply but decided to give the watch committee time to adopt a new pay scale
83. Peacock issued a general order reminding policemen of regulations against a union but
also announced that he was «desirous of speaking to the members of the Manchester City
Police on the question of Pay and Conditions of Service». He arranged to meet with all
ranks at Central Hall on 9 October84. He allowed the men to decide whether they should
keep their current pay, which matched the Met scale but included a twenty-shilling non-
pensionable bonus, or if they preferred to adopt the Met scale. Favoring pensionable pay,
the  men requested and received the  Met  scale85.  Peacock’s  willingness  to  meet  with
delegations helped prevent disputes from getting out of control. But that it had taken the
London  strike  to  gain  this  consideration,  similar  to  previous  gains  only  coming  in
response to crises, was a lesson not lost on the men.
30 Liverpool Head Constable Caldwell’s tactics were similar to those of Peacock, immediately
allowing his divisions to meet to discuss pay and conditions. In September, the men held
mass meetings that involved all ranks, even though Caldwell had advised them to limit
meetings to delegates from each division. On 25 September, based on their decision, the
city adopted the Met scale86. On 7 October, Caldwell announced that his men could vote
whether to adopt a flat sixteen shilling war bonus or to keep the twelve shilling Met
bonus that added two and a half shillings per child,  stating that he was «desirous of
ascertaining the opinion of the majority of the members of the force»87. However, unlike
Manchester  where  the  main  problem  was  pay,  Liverpool  men  were  concerned  with
entrenched favoritism and corruption. That same month, rumors estimated that ninety
percent  of  the  Liverpool  force  had  joined  the  NUPPO  because,  as  P.C.  Smithwick
remarked, «more promotions were made by the back door than the front»88.  Caldwell
himself symbolized promotion based on connections rather than street experience. While
visiting Liverpool in October, Birmingham Chief Constable Rafter learned that London
P.C. Thiel was there to help organize the local branch of the NUPPO89.
31 In Birmingham, Chief Constable Rafter was less diplomatic than Peacock or Caldwell. The
watch committee adopted the Met scale on 2 September90 but unlike elsewhere, Rafter did
not call force meetings to discuss the new pay scales. His men understood the futility of
sending NUPPO delegations to talk to him. On 7 October, when Peacock and Caldwell were
allowing force meetings,  Rafter issued a statement allowing for a permanent elective
representative committee to study grievances and handle requests for meetings. This was
as far as he was prepared to go. At the same time, he reminded the men that both he and
the watch committee looked after their interests and that the London strike had been a
shameful act91. However, his sharp condemnation of the London strike and the NUPPO did
not deter his policemen from organizing a union branch. Rafter was infuriated to read in
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a local newspaper that the Trades and Labour Council had received an application for
affiliation from the newly formed NUPPO branch in Birmingham92.
32 At the same time that chief constables were responding to the strike locally, the national
government recommended that representative boards be created as an alternative to the
NUPPO. But the boards were not a general success. Either watch committees refused to
take them seriously, or policemen saw them as a tool of the authorities to undermine the
union. Birmingham policemen disliked the boards since they could only present their
case and retire; the watch committee made decisions in camera93. In spite of this lack of
consultation, the board did eventually get leave restored and payment for leave lost due
to the war94.  Knowing that Rafter would never tolerate the NUPPO, supporters of the
board decided to be realistic and take what representation they could get. But others
hoped  for  more,  creating  dissension  within  the  ranks.  In  Manchester,  when  their
representatives tried to present various grievances, watch committee members «were
drawing different figures and different animals, etc., on the papers, taking no notice;
others were going in and out of the room»95. In February 1919, Manchester policemen
declared the representative boards disbanded and that all  further business should be
given to their NUPPO branch. They told Peacock that he had failed to keep the promises
he  made at  the  October  meeting96.  Caldwell  allowed Liverpool  policemen to  vote  on
whether or not to set up representative boards. The vote was 449 in favor of the boards
and 738 against, with nearly a thousand not voting at all97. In light of the vote, Caldwell
decided not to create boards but failed to respond to the danger signals the vote results
indicated. Less than a quarter of the men considered it worthwhile to try the boards.
Many believe  that  the  boards  would  come under  the  control  of  some faction;  many
thought official representation was pointless given the entrenched networks in the force;
many preferred the union. Overall, the boards were too obviously meant as a government
alternative to the union.
33 The successes of 1918 and the weakness of the representative boards went to the heads of
NUPPO’s  leaders.  They  made  demands  regarding  recognition  of  the  union,  pensions,
overtime,  and victimization of  union members.  They made dubious  claims regarding
membership, including that ninety percent of most forces had joined the NUPPO98. But
they miscalculated, assuming that policemen wanted a union rather than being forced
into it by the extremities of wartime. Most policemen had experienced the 1918 strike
from a distance and could put off the reality of a strike call. In spite of the results, many
felt uncomfortable that the ‘no strike’ policy had been abandoned without their input. In
London, peer pressure and intimidation had been necessary to convince men reluctant to
walk out when the call to strike came. NUPPO contended that their tactics were justified
since they needed a majority of policemen striking. They did not understand that with
the Desborough Committee meeting in 1919, the NUPPO could no longer say that the
union was the only way to get the authorities to listen.
34 In  Spring  1919,  police  forces  organized  delegations  from  all  ranks  to  testify  to  the
Committee on the Police Service of England, Wales and Scotland. City officials and chief
constables  attended in  large  numbers.  Given the  press  coverage  of  NUPPO activities
throughout the country as well as reports from their own forces, chief constables and
other authorities could not pretend that everything was fine now that the London strike
was over and the Met scale in place. Many of the policemen elected by their colleagues to
testify were NUPPO members or from representative boards. Many had served in the war.
While  few of  these  men supported  a  strike  policy,  their  membership  in  the  NUPPO
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indicated their  commitment to changing the way policing was organized.  Committee
questioning  of  witnesses  was  detailed  and  relentless.  Witnesses  giving  vague  or
inaccurate answers were pressed hard; high-ranking officials giving poor responses found
themselves forced to admit their ignorance. Committee members became impatient with
police authorities insisting that police pay was basically adequate but then qualifying this
when pressed for details99. Caldwell had to concede that he had no knowledge of family
budgets for constables and was surprised to learn that they were stretched to the limit100.
While policemen were also challenged when making broad claims regarding pay and
representation, their exaggerations out of a desire for better treatment created a better
impression than officials ignorant of conditions in their own cities.
35 The committee soon realized that even the new Met scale was insufficient to support a
police family at the respectable level expected of them. Less than a year after calling the
Met scale perfectly adequate, chief constables suddenly acknowledged what their men
had been telling them about budgets.  Caldwell and Peacock advocated a base pay for
constables of sixty-four shillings per week, compared to seventy-two shillings per week
for dock laborers, calculating that benefits added twenty percent to the value of the wage.
Other  authorities  agreed101.  Police  witnesses  before  the  Desborough  Committee
recommended a scale beginning at eighty or ninety shillings a week102. Men argued that
their pay should be higher since «the public generally value a thing according to the price
they pay for it» and «it is necessary for the public safety that he should be placed beyond
such influences» as corruption and bribes103. In July 1919, the committee recommended a
new pay scale beginning at seventy shillings a week, more than double pre-war scales,
and that free housing be provided through allowances or police housing. The committee
agreed that  policemen’s  special  relationship  with  the  community  required  that  they
maintain a respectable standard of living, free from the temptations of bribes and tips104.
They concluded that police work had changed so materially over the last twenty years
that their new responsibilities should be recognized and rewarded105.  The Desborough
committee  decreed  that  policemen  were  skilled  workers,  probably  one  of  the  most
important achievements of the 1918 strike.
36 With the Desborough Committee meeting and rumored to be recommending a substantial
pay increase, the NUPPO struggled to keep momentum. In May 1919, NUPPO leadership
sent out a misleading national ballot, a yes vote comprehending a demand for better pay,
reinstatement of P.C. Spackman dismissed for union activities, and the right to strike. In
reaction to the ballot,  chief  constables warned that any policemen participating in a
strike would be dismissed without pension rights. The Liverpool statement added that
«fear of intimidation will not be accepted as an excuse for failing to parade for duty»106.
With the war over, authorities could take a firm stand. Most policemen preferred to wait
and see what the Desborough Committee recommended before taking action. On 1 June,
the NUPPO claimed that nearly 45,000 ballots were in favor of the right to strike and that
under 5,000 were against it107. But on 13 June, the Review reported that the Manchester
branch of the NUPPO had voted against a strike and that many were resigning from the
union now that pay demands had been satisfied108.
37 Despite the questionable June ballot, the NUPPO called for a strike when the 1919 Police
Act under consideration in parliament clearly banned police membership in unions. The
act required policemen to resign from organizations and imposed penalties on anyone
‘causing disaffection’;  as  a  compromise between a union and no association at  all,  it
included a  Police  Federation,  recognizing that  representation was  needed.  Policemen
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feared that the federation would be used to punish anyone who opened «his mouth for
the ventilation of any just grievance»109, but most men would not strike to protest the ban
on the NUPPO.  The call  to  strike  was  undermined even more when the Desborough
Committee  issued  their  recommendations  for  the  new  pay  scale  on  1  July.  The
government announced a £10 advance on new police wages to be given out on 31 July, the
day called for the strike110. Even before the official announcement, watch committees let
their forces know that they planned to adopt the new scale, taking effect retroactively on
1 April111. All this took the wind out of the union’s sails. And the Desborough Committee
was still meeting to discuss its final recommendations. Since it had already responded
favorably to police pay concerns, most policemen hoped that its final report would satisfy
their grievances.
38 On 31 July 1919,  despite rumors that ninety-five percent of the Manchester men had
struck, a meeting of their union branch voted unanimously to remain loyal to their oath
112.  P.C. Houlden told the meeting that «There was a force somewhere in this country
trying to lead the National Union of the Police to become the thin end of the wedge for a
social revolution (Cheers). He hoped they in that room would say unanimously, ‘This must
not  be  in  Manchester’  (Cheers)»113.  They  did  send  a  statement  to  the  government
requesting  that  offending  clauses  in  the  Police  Bill  be  deleted  or  altered  and  they
requested  that  the  new  Police  Federation  be  allowed  to  address  individual  cases  of
discipline and promotion. Manchester policemen believed that the recommendations of
the Desborough committee met their goals of representation and recognition as a skilled
career.
39 If Manchester men were more or less satisfied, Birmingham men were less optimistic.
Their  watch  committee  had  a  reputation  as  one  of  the  worst  in  England  and  chief
constable Rafter was hostile to the idea of a police association of any kind114. Rafter made
them unwilling to trust authorities to protect their interests, as he insisted that he did.
Wartime experience as sergeants or drill instructors made it difficult to accept a return to
unfair networks and their subordinate positions. The atmosphere was tense. P.C. Sinclair
told the Desborough Committee, «Every member of the Force who knows of any cases of
unjust treatment feels that possibly it might be his turn next. Naturally, through that
fear, he turns to the Union, knowing that unity is strength»115. Many were not convinced
that the Desborough committee would address their grievances without another show of
strength by the union.
40 The call to strike was answered in Birmingham by at least one hundred and nineteen
men, including three sergeants, nine percent of the total strength of thirteen hundred
and forty116.  More men went on strike but later snuck back on duty. Others were not
reported by their superior officers immediately, allowing them to change their minds
when the strike’s failure became obvious.  The overwhelming majority of strikers had
good  service  records  and  possibly  felt  that  their  careers  had  stalled  due  to  lack  of
connections117. The leader, P.S. Edward Taylor, one of the officers who had rescued Lloyd
George from rioters in 1901, was quickly dismissed «for inciting men to leave their duty
and going out on a Police Strike»118. By 3 August, Rafter congratulated men who remained
«staunch and true to their honourable undertakings». Rafter blamed the strike on prison
warders, rather than on police officers, again refusing to admit that his men might have
grounds  for  discontent119.  He  reminded  the  watch  committee,  facing  the  expense  of
replacing  strikers,  that  «the  men who had been dismissed from the  Force  were  not
workmen within the meaning of the [Trades Disputes Act 1906] and that therefore Police
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Strikers were not entitled to indulge in picketing»120. Policemen who had not gone on
strike urged that an enquiry be made «for the purpose of punishing the real offenders
and  the  exculpation  and  rehabilitation  of  those  who  are  found  deserving».  But  a
delegation from ‘A’ division failed to convince Rafter to consider reinstating strikers121.
The Birmingham strike failed and the strikers were never rehired. Rafter would not even
allow a voluntary collection on behalf of strikers in 1920122.
41 Policemen in Liverpool were also not convinced that the Desborough Committee could fix
the  problems  disgracing  their  force.  A  union  seemed  required  to  pressure  local
authorities.  Wartime  had  heightened  street  constables’  animosity  towards  clerk
constables, seen as avoiding dangerous assignments, and war had amplified Liverpool’s
religious tensions. Men returned from the trenches to find themselves out of touch with
old networks or left outside of new ones. With the NUPPO, they found they had a network
of their own that was taken seriously by authorities. In testimony to the Desborough
Committee, P.S. Miles told how he had been passed over for promotion in spite of his
‘clean book’ and his passing the sergeants exam. He only gained sergeant’s rank when the
NUPPO put pressure on chief constable Caldwell, who admitted to the committee that
Miles had a genuine grievance123. The success of the NUPPO in Miles’ case and the hope
that it created made support for the union much stronger in Liverpool than in any other
city.
42 In Liverpool, at least a thousand men out of twenty-two hundred answered the call to
strike124. Even the crack ‘A’ division, the fast track to promotion, had eighty percent of its
constables on strike125.  Rumors spread regarding strikes in other cities,  claiming that
Manchester and London were nearly all on strike, when actually the opposite was true126.
P.S.  George Miles urged strikers to remain firm since «they had fought for liberty in
France but now they were fighting for themselves»127. The shortage of policemen led to
two days of rioting, destroying streets of shops. After wartime restrictions on food and
goods, Liverpool ran wild. Fourteen hundred troops had to be scattered throughout the
city, nine policemen were seriously injured by looters, and one looter was killed by a
soldier. The battleship, H.M.S. Valiant, and two destroyers were sent to protect the docks
128. Police pensioners were recalled and new recruits were rushed onto the streets129. Due
to the critical situation, the watch committee agreed to reinstate strikers who returned to
duty before 8:00 p.m. on 1 August, hoping to encourage back any men striking through
intimidation130. But only fifty-four men responded.
43 Pent-up resentment and tension exploded into reckless activity among policemen as well
as civilians. Groups of strikers wandered the city, pressuring colleagues to strike. «Pickets
or extremists» intimidated men into not reporting for duty131.  Pickets threatened P.C.
Summersall with «personal violence» if he did not go home. When he reported for duty
the next day, he had been dismissed132. On the strike being declared, P.C. Swift wrote out
his application for his pension and went to regulate traffic.  A large crowd of strikers
harassed him so he went home. He stayed home for a week, later saying, «I never refused
duty until I was terrorised»133. It is difficult to know how many men claiming intimidation
actually struck voluntarily, caught up in the intensity of the moment. The ambiguous
feelings of even voluntary strikers were shown by striker P.C. Morley who arrested two
men for breaking and entering shops during the looting on 3 August134. Other strikers
appalled by the rioting asked to be readmitted to help restore order but without success
135. Lacking the urgency of wartime, this strike failed. As in Birmingham, loyal policemen
were rewarded and strikers punished. The watch committee did not grant strikers arrears
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in pay until Christmas Eve, 1919136. Caldwell condemned the strikers for violating their
oath of office and for destroying the confidence of citizens in the force. He called men
striking through intimidation guilty of «folly and cowardice». Readmitting them would be
an insult to the loyal men who remained on duty137.
44 Even though the 1919 strikes failed, it took place while the Desborough Committee was
still meeting, forcing the committee to recognize that police discontent was not simply a
matter of pay. They had to take seriously testimony regarding representation, favoritism
and corruption. That another major strike could happen so soon and could again take
authorities by surprise made committee members wonder if police leadership was simply
incompetent. Both the 1918 and 1919 strikes uncovered a disturbing lack of awareness by
police authorities of their own men’s resentment of unfair practices in addition to their
ignorance of their men’s ability to live on their wages. To maintain a viable police force,
the committee needed to establish communication between the ranks and commanding
officers.  Abuse  of  promotion  and  discipline  had  to  be  ended  before  it  created  the
disintegration of loyalty seen in Liverpool. Watch Committees had to stop assuming that
concerns  from policemen were  unimportant  or  exaggerated.  The  economic  status  of
policemen had to be high enough to compensate for the rigors of the job. Eleven hundred
Liverpool and Birmingham fired strikers were casualties of these belated realizations138.
45 The 1920 report of the Desborough Committee reflected efforts to address every facet of
police life. Training and education were to be improved and a standard instruction book
issued.  The  weekly  rest  day  and  annual  leave  were  regularized  to  prevent  watch
committees  from meddling to  save  money.  Disciplinary  authority  was  given to  chief
constables  with the right  of  men to appeal  dismissal  to  a  tribunal  appointed by the
Secretary of State. Promotion was to be based on standard national examinations as well
as chief constable’s recommendations. To help improve the quality of leadership, no one
without police experience could be appointed as chief constable except in exceptional
cases.  Matters  concerning  pay,  pensions,  medical  care,  and  various  allowances  were
carefully  outlined.  To ensure that  forces  were following these recommendations,  the
number of inspectors of constabulary was increased139. While the report outlined an ideal
situation,  policemen  could  now  point  to  the  committee’s  recommendations  if  local
authorities diverged from the plan.
46 The committee  did  not  support  a  police  union.  Instead,  they recommended a  Police
Federation, showing some progress from the 1913 circular barring an association of any
kind. But the federation remained as weak and ineffectual as the representative boards.
The  lack  of  support  was  tied  to  its official  creation140.  Almost  immediately,  the
Birmingham watch committee reminded its branch that «the Police Force is organised to
perform Police Duty, and whilst the Police Authority is conveniencing Members of the
Force as  much as  possible,  the performance of  Police  Duty must  always  be the first
consideration»141.  Even though the Desborough committee stated that «we regard the
maintenance of a sound esprit de corps and relations of mutual confidence between the
various ranks as one of the principal tests of the efficient management of a police force»
142,  the federation did not provide an effective mechanism for mutual confidence. The
potential for explosion remained.
47 Sadly, efforts to improve the quality of policing and fairness of promotion created an
unpleasant  split  between  men  recruited  after  the  war  and  men  remaining  from
beforehand. The ‘old police’ had survived harsh times together. They resented ‘new men’
who not only benefited from the 1919 Police Act without having paid for it but who often
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considered the ‘old men’ to be inferior policemen. The new promotion examinations were
difficult for men hired under pre-war education standards who saw ‘new men’ with little
experience promoted ahead of them. The Desborough Committee urged that promotion
not  be  by  examination  results  alone,  «because  of  the  importance  of  initiative,  tact,
judgment,  and other personal qualifications which cannot be gauged by means of  an
examination  paper,»  but  no  system  for  measuring  these  qualities  was  defined.  A
recommendation to have ‘experience points’ added into examinations scores was never
implemented143. But for new recruits, the pay was good, and the force was transforming
into ‘the service’ and a real career. Stories of pre-war injustice and wartime privation
must have appeared to be tales of frustrated old union sympathizers to men who did not
live through them.
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NOTES
2. Desborough Committee (DC)(Evidence 1920, pp. 184, 173). P.C. William Sinclair, Birmingham
City Police, stated, «We believe that policemen have for years suffered in silence; they have had
no medium through which they could voice their grievances excepting through a few friends in
Parliament» (DC [Evidence 1920, p. 297]).
3. Steedman (1984, p. 93), Manchester City Police Roster Cards, 1900-1919. This trend continued
from 1920 to 1939, with about twenty percent leaving with less than five years and fifty-five
percent making it to retirement age.
4. Allen (1958, p. 133); Emsley (1996, pp. 97-98).
5. Manchester  Watch  Committee Minutes  (MWCM)  (1  March  1901,  vol.  13,  no.  103)  copy  of
complete oath.
6. Liverpool called their chief the ‘head constable’ until 1919.
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7. Letters  to  the  Police  Review complained  endlessly  about  ‘anti-Romish  domination’,
Freemasonry,  and  nepotism  within  the  Liverpool  City  Police.  Even  making  allowances  for
exaggeration, letters from this city far outnumber those from anyplace else.
8. Policemen began communicating across force lines at the same time that the Chief Constables
Association,  also  founded  in  1893,  was  providing  similar  opportunities  for  those  in  higher
positions of authority. The CCA, which included the heads of borough forces, compared local
conditions in a national forum similar to the Review (Emsley, 1996, pp. 100-101).
9. Police Review and Parade Gossip (PR) (12 January 1900, pp. 15-16). Forty-six forces began at 24/-;
twenty-two at 23/-; twenty-one at 25/-; fourteen began at 22/-; eleven at 21/-. A handful of forces
made 26/- or 27/- a week and a couple made 20/- or 19/-. Very small forces paid both high and
low wages so size alone was not the deciding factor. Larger than most forces, Birmingham had a
strength of 700 men; Liverpool had 1460; Manchester 1031.
10. MWCM (22 March 1900, vol. 10, no. 71; 13 June 1900, vol. 10, no. 138); PR (30 March 1900,
p. 154; 22 June 1900, p. 291).
11. PR (30 March 1900, p. 153). See also PR (12 April 1900, pp. 175-176). Some committee members
did object that it was inappropriate to take this action in light of their not paying policemen a
shilling or two more a week, but they were over-ruled.
12. PR (22 June 1900, p. 291).
13. Manchester City Police General Orders (MGO) (6 February 1901).
14. Superintendents  and  inspectors  tended  to  petition  separately,  reflecting  problems  with
cross-rank communication.
15. Liverpool Watch Committee Minutes (LWCM) (23 July 1900, pp. 172-176); PR (21 September
1900,  p.  448);  Liverpool  Orders  of  the  Watch  Committee  to  the  Head  Constable  (LWCHC)
(26 November 1900).
16. PR  (28  June  1901,  p.  303;  25  October  1901,  p.  508;  1  November  1901,  pp.  519-520).
Birmingham’s watch committee did approve pay increases for superintendents and inspectors in
1901, which did little for morale in the ranks. (PR [18 October 1901, p. 496]).
17. Birmingham City Police Orders (BPO) (23 November 1901, p. 574).
18. BPO (23 November 1901, p. 574).
19. PR (28 June 1901, p. 303; 25 July 1902, p. 351; 13 February 1903, pp. 75-76).
20. Birmingham’s day beats ran in split shifts, the first from six to ten a.m. and two to six p.m.,
and the second from ten a.m. to two p.m. and six to ten p.m. The men requested that eight-hour
shifts  be  instated  since  split  shifts  forced  constables  to  spend  double  tram  fares  every  day
travelling to and from work or else spending the four-hour intermediate period wasting time in
the city. The policeman’s health was the unvarying defense for split shifts(Birmingham Watch
Committee Minutes [BWCM] [15 July 1903,  pp.  448-452]).  The issue was revived in 1928.  The
watch committee replied, «eight hours continous [sic] tour of duty on the streets, with only a
short interval for meals, would involve heavy strain upon a man’s physique and a continous [sic]
lowering  of  the  vitality,  with  a  resultant  increase  in  liability  to  sickness».  In  1932,  another
request received a similar answer, adding that continuous shifts would require the expense of
hiring relief for meal times. Finally, in 1937, the committee agreed to try eight-hours shifts on a
trial basis for one year. In April 1938 chief constable Moriarity informed the committee that no
difficulties had been experienced and the health of the men was sound (BPO [30 January 1928, p.
13779]; BWCM [6 April 1931, report no. 1, p. 3; 7 April 1938, report no. 5, p. 4]).
21. PR (7 August 1903, p. 381).
22. LWCM (14 May 1907, pp. 350-354). This budget is similar to many submitted to the Police
Review by police wives.
23. PR (12 January 1906, p. 20).
24. PR (11 March 1904, p. 124). Pensioners could not be fired though they still risked losing their
pensions, however, if watch committees decided they had violated their pension terms.
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25. PR (1 June 1906, p. 261).
26. Sellwood (1978, p. 94).
27. BPO (1 August 1907, p. 116).
28. MWCM (January 1909, vol. 42, no. 77).
29. PR (17 January 1908, p. 34).
30. PR (10 September 1909, p. 442).
31. Birmingham Evening Dispatch as quoted in PR (11 February 1910, p. 70).
32. PR (10 September 1909, p. 442).
33. PR (22 October 1909, p. 507).
34. PR (22 October 1909, p. 507).
35. Emsley (1996, p. 133).
36. LWCM (12 February 1912).
37. The bad reputation of the ‘clerk track’ went beyond city boundaries. Inspector Thomas Dale
of  Newcastle-upon-Tyne  City  Police  stated,  when  asked  about  the  practice  of  improper
promotion of office clerks, «I think Liverpool is the most prominent in the minds of the police
generally.»  (DC,  Evidence 1920,  p.  129).  Unlike the copper plate  found in most  police record
books,  Liverpool’s  records  were  often  illegible,  the  clerks  having  their  positions  due  to
connections rather than skills.
38. MGO (7 April 1911); MWCM (20 February 1912, vol. 53, no. 183).
39. PR (8 March 1912, p. 111).
40. PR (8 March 1912, p. 111).
41. PR (31 October 1913, pp. 523-524). The possibility of internationally affiliated police unions
made governments even more leery of allowing local ones.
42. Emsley (1996, p. 99).
43. PR (26 September 1913, p. 459).
44. In January 1914, a deputation of Manchester inspectors, sergeants and constables unhappy
with changes in retirement qualifications decided to be represented by counsel in their dealings
with the watch committee, hoping to give their petition more weight. Trouble began when the
committee  had  granted  new scales  of  pay  effective  January  8,  1914.  Constables  began  at  28
shillings per week, reaching 35 shillings after six years (MGO [8 January 1914]). It was the first
pay increase since 1901. However, the new scale upset advantages under the old scale for about
three hundred men regarding when they could retire (PR [16 January 1914, p. 31]). These men,
along  with  their  counsel,  petitioned  the  watch  committee  to  correct  the  anomaly  but  the
committee decided against any alterations to the new scale (MGO [31 January 1914, 3 February
1914, 14 March 1914]). The rejection rankled. A Review article described the continuing sense of
grievance among the older men «at the mercy» of the watch committee (PR [5 February 1915, p.
67]). Their inability to have an impact on the committee, even when legally represented, helped
push Manchester policemen towards becoming among the most active supporters of a union.
45. PR (24 October 1913, p. 508).
46. BPO (30 October 1913, p. 587).
47. PR (19 December 1913, p. 609); BPO (30 October 1913, p. 587).
48. PR (31 October 1913, pp. 523-524).
49. Emsley (1996, p. 99).
50. MWCM (25 April 1918, no. 106, vol. 76); November 1913 letter quoted in discussion of union
appearing in 1918.
51. BWCM (8 October 1917, p. 159) copy of August 1914 Scale of Pay.
52. Immediately,  Birmingham policemen in the military had a grievance because their wives
received an allowance of twelve shillings a week while Manchester and Liverpool wives received
fifteen. (BWCM [7 August 1914, pp. 114-115]; MGO [20 August 1914]; LWCM [12 June 1917, p. 476]).
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In Birmingham, children under age fifteen received 2/-, parents dependent on an unmarried son
receiving 8/-. The Manchester and Liverpool rates were about the same.
53. Policemen had to get permission to enlist since forces could not afford to have too many men
leave at once and since policemen had important duties on the home front. In December 1916,
Birmingham had 300 men in the army and navy; 6 months later Manchester had 700 men in the
services (BWCM [19 December 1916, p. 2]; MWCM [7 June 1917, vol. 74, no. 20]).
54. MGO (8 January 1914).
55. PR (22 October 1915, p. 507). See PR (18 February 1916, p. 75) for letters from Manchester and
Liverpool constables.
56. MWCM (21 March 1916, vol. 70, no. 32).
57. PR (31 March 1916, p. 151).
58. MWCM (3 April 1916, vol. 70, no. 54); MGO (13 April 1916).
59. MWCM (4 January 1917, vol. 73, no. 19).
60. DC (Evidence 1920, p. 122); also PR (22 October 1915, p. 507). According to Ministry of Labour
figures, building laborers wages had increased 115%, engineering laborers 152%, railway laborers
83% to 165%, and carters 86% to 120%.
61. PR (18 February 1916, p. 75; 31 March 1916, p. 151; 24 November 1916, p. 466).
62. PR (1 June 1917, p. 172); BWCM (16 June 1917, p. 103).
63. LWCM (12 June 1917, p. 476); BWCM (3 October 1917, p. 309). Liverpool children received
3/6d; Birmingham children received 3/-.
64. Birmingham constables had a bonus of 2/6d. a week; raised to 4/6d.; then to 9/6d (BPO [1
September 1915, p. 36]; BWCM [19 December 1916, p. 5; 16 June 1917, p. 103]) Liverpool: 3/- a
week to men under £2 a week pay, 2/- to men over £2; changed to 6/- for married men, 3/- for
single (PR [18 February 1916, p. 75]; LWCM [12 December 1916, p. 98]) Manchester: for extra day
duty per week, 6/- a week for constables and 7/- for sergeants; bonuses began January 1917 at 7/-
a week; then to 9/- and 12/- (MWCM [3 April 1916, vol. 70, no. 54]; MGO [13 April 1916]; MWCM [4
January 1917, vol. 73, no. 19; 16 August 1917, vol. 74, no. 133]; MGO [16 August 1917]; MWCM [15
November 1917, vol. 75, no. 56]; MGO [21 November 1917]).
65. PR (3 August 1917, p. 243).
66. MGO (5 August 1914, 27 November 1914, 22 June 1915).
67. BPO (8 January 1919, p. 403).
68. MGO (13 April 1916); LWCM (29 November 1917, p. 28); BPO (8 January 1919, p. 403).
69. PR (11 December 1914, p. 596).
70. BWCM (8 October 1917, p. 159).
71. PR (18 January 1918, p. 19).
72. LWCM (29 November 1917, p. 28); MGO (21 March 1918); MWCM (10 April 1918, vol. 76, no. 99;
7 August 1918, vol. 77, no. 65; 22 August 1918, vol. 77, no. 72). Liverpool bonus to 10/8d., 2/- child
allowance, then to 13/4d (LWCM [29 January 1918, pp. 152-153; 28 May 1918, p. 342]) Birmingham
to 13/6d and then to 20/- (BWCM [1 May 1918, p. 301; 22 July 1918, p. 345]; BPO [30 July 1918,
p.87]).
73. MWCM (25 April 1918, vol. 76, no. 106).
74. MWCM (22 August 1918, vol. 77, no. 72); MGO (29 August 1918).
75. King (1988, p. 133).
76. Short accounts of the 1918 and 1919 strikes from the official point of view are given in Dixon
(1966, pp. 5-20) and Nott-Bower (1926, pp. 283-302). The police point of view is given in Reynolds
and Judge (1968). On the NUPPO, Allen (1958); on Birmingham, Shackleton (1983); on Liverpool,
Bean (1980, pp. 633-653); also Sellwood (1978) and King (1988).
77. PR (13 September 1918, p. 292); also PR (6 September 1918, pp. 283-286).
78. King (1988, p. 134).
79. Dixon (1966, p. 6).
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84. MGO (2, 8 October 1918).
85. MGO (10 October 1918); MWCM (17 October 1918, vol. 77, no. 117).
86. Liverpool City Police Chief Constable’s Orders (LCCO) (3-7 September 1918, pp. 21-23).
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ABSTRACTS
This articles explores how English borough policemen during the early 1900s grappled with how
to organize effectively to improve their conditions of service without violating their oaths of
office. Policemen faced an increasing load of duties and responsibilities yet suffered from eroding
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pay scales and lack of  recognition.  Local  watch committee and police forces did not provide
policemen with a mechanism for voicing their grievances beyond submitting petitions which
were frequently ignored. Frustrated with their lack of progress, policemen searched for ways to
make their voices heard. Initially, the obvious choice of a police union was resisted since most
men found the possibility of a police strike incompatible with their duties to uphold law and
order.  However,  the pressures of the First World War combined with continued silence from
watch  committees  regarding  their  grievances  finally  precipitated  the  organization  of  the
National Union of Police and Prison Officers (NUPPO) and the calling of police strikes in 1918 and
1919. The parliamentary committee investigating this embarrassing situation traced the roots of
the problem to the refusal of police authorities to listen to their own men. National legislation
resolved many grievances regarding pay, status and promotions. But the need for policemen to
have a voice was less easily resolved. The new Police Federation gave policemen a forum but was
viewed with suspicion by the men as an official creation and it could still be ignored by police
authorities. A dangerous lack of communication and potential for explosion remained.
Cet article examine comment les policiers municipaux anglais se sont débattus, au début du XXe
siècle, avec la question de savoir comment s’organiser pour obtenir une amélioration de leurs
conditions de travail sans violer les devoirs de leur charge. Alors que la charge de travail et les
responsabilités des policiers s’accroissaient, leur rémunération s’érodait et ils souffraient d’une
insuffisante reconnaissance professionnelle. Les comités de police locaux et les corps de police
eux-mêmes ne fournissaient aux policiers aucun moyen institutionnel de faire connaître leurs
revendications,  mis  à  part  le  recours  à  des  pétitions,  au  reste  fréquemment  ignorées.  La
frustration née de cette situation poussa les policiers à se faire entendre autrement. Dans un
premier temps, ils refusèrent de s’engager dans la voie syndicale, la plupart des policiers jugeant
l’éventualité d’une grève incompatible avec leur mission de maintien de l’ordre. Les pressions
provoquées par la Première Guerre mondiale et le silence persistant des comités de police vis-à-
vis de leurs demandes amena cependant la création de la National Union of Police and Prison
Officers (NUPPO) et à l’appel à la grève en 1918 et 1919. La commission parlementaire chargée
d’étudier les causes de cette embarrassante situation les attribua au refus des autorités de police
d’écouter  leurs  propres  hommes.  Une  législation  nationale  régla  une  grande  partie  des
problèmes touchant aux rémunérations, au statut et aux carrières. Mais la difficulté du problème
du  droit  d’expression  des  policiers  fut  plus  ardue.  La  nouvelle  Police  Federation  pouvait
constituer  un  forum,  mais  elle  était  perçue  avec  méfiance  par  les  policiers  car  c’était  une
institution officielle,  que les  autorités  locales  n’étaient  du reste  pas  tenues  d’entendre.  Il  en
résulta une absence menaçante de communication et un risque d’explosion latent.
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